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. Robinson LADB news analyst Guatemala City A "Fujimori-style" victory was how some of the
foreign journalists who descended on this capital to cover the recent general elections described
Jorge Serrano Elias' rise from a distant sixth place among a pack of candidates four months before
the vote, to win a presidential runoff in early January. These were the second elections since
Guatemala returned to civilian rule five years ago, and the first civilian succession in over three
decades. However, Serrano took office in the midst of what international monitors say are the
worst human rights crisis since the return to civilian rule, a deteriorating economy, a resurgent
guerrilla movement, and growing social malaise. These problems, if not addressed quickly by
the new president, threaten to upset a very tenuous stability and return the country to the social
upheavals of the early 1980s (see forthcoming Part II of series). "The results for the electorate will
be mediocre," predicted outgoing President Vinicio Cerezo, three days before the first round of
voting on Nov. 11. Indeed, abstentionism reached 43% in the first round, and then surpassed 56%
in the Jan. 6 run-off, up from 35% abstention in the 1985 election that brought Cerezo to office. On
election day, a top official of the Electoral Tribunal said, "Everything is calm across the country.
The only problem is that people aren't voting." Serrano thus assumed office on Jan. 14 with the
endorsement of 936,400 voters, about 30% of 3.2 million registered voters in a population of an
estimated 9.34 million (1990). The Guatemalan electoral process opened in May 1990 with the
registration of 16 parties and 12 candidates. With the exception of a small center-left coalition
headed by the Democratic Socialist Party (PSD), and the incumbent centrist Christian Democratic
Party (DC), competitors in the elections consisted of a panoply of right to extreme-right political
factions. The participation of social and political forces ranging from the center to the left could have
provided a more pluralistic character to these elections. However, these forces had been largely
decimated in the military repression of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and in the renewed spiral of
human rights violations since 1987, which has earned Guatemala distinction as the worst human
rights violator in the Western Hemisphere. After the electorate as a whole, another big loser in the
elections was the centrist alternative that Cerezo and his Christian Democratic Party attempted to
promote since 1986. The inability of the party to implement any significant social reforms, and to
curtail the power of the military, as well as erratic economic policies and widespread governmental
corruption, steadily eroded the DC and its political project during Cerezo's administration. A lastminute bid by the DC to rejuvenate its campaign along populist lines and move the party to the left
was ineffective. The DC's dramatic slide in popularity accelerated in the year preceding the vote due
to neo-liberal economic measures that sparked a sharp decline in living standards, and, according
to analysts, to the poor choice of Cerezo protege Alfonso Cabrera as presidential candidate. Cabrera
was accused of corruption and links to drug trafficking. The third big loser in the elections was
the Guatemalan extreme right political project, epitomized in the National Liberation Movement
(MLN) the party that headed the 1954 coup and first organized the death squads. In the 1980s, the
traditional extreme right was increasingly eclipsed as a political and social force in Guatemala. The
MLN, once one of the largest legal political forces in the country, won only three of 116 seats in
the National Congress. Many of its prominent representatives including Alvaro Arzu, who formed
his own party, PAN (National Advance Party), and came in third in the voting, and Manuel Ayau,
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who left the MLN to become Jorge Carpio's vice presidential running mate (UCN or Union of the
National Center ticket) , have shifted allegiance away from the traditional extreme right. Although
the election was mainly among different representatives of the right, to characterize the vote as a
petty scramble for access to state power and privilege among the oligarchy that has traditionally
characterized Guatemala's blend of civilian-military politics, is to negate what was a significant
dispute over shifting political and economic projects. At play in these elections were divisions
between the traditional oligarchy and business community, and elements calling for modernization
of the state apparatus and the economy the so-called "technocrats," or the "New Right" in Central
America. Three candidates emerged from the pack to lead the race in the final weeks: Carpio and
his UCN Union of the National Center (UCN), Guatemala City Mayor Alvaro Arzu, who heads the
PAN, and Serrano and his tiny Solidarity Action Movement (MAS). Although all three are rightwing politicians advocating economic liberalization programs, Carpio, the frontrunner, became
associated in these elections with the traditional right, and Serrano, with the "New Right" that came
to power in other Central American countries in the late 1980s. Arzu stood somewhere between the
two. Carpio, who publishes the country's second largest newspaper El Grafico, originally projected
a "centrist" image for his party. But as the electoral process developed, he changed tactics, seeking
out and winning the support of important traditional business sectors as well as several ultra-right
parties who fell by the wayside in the electoral race, and military extremist factions linked to the
attempted coups of 1988 and 1989. Carpio's candidacy as representative of Guatemala's traditional
right was cemented when he chose Manuel Ayau as his running mate in a July 1990 meeting in
Miami of the UCN, four far-right parties, businesspersons from the Coordinating Committee of
Agriculture, Commerce, Industry and Finance Associations (CACIF), and conservative US patrons.
Ayau, a former CACIF official and MLN politician, is founder of the elite Francisco Marroquin
University, which schools most of the country's business leaders, and is considered the intellectual
bellwether of CACIF interests. In contrast, both Arzu and Serrano were more closely identified with
New Right professional and business sectors interested in modernizing Guatemala along the lines
of neo-liberal economic models now sweeping Latin America. The New Right is also interested
in exploring new techniques for diffusing social tensions and building long-term stability. Arzu
began his political career in the MLN, but by 1982 had established the PAN, and won the mayorship
of the capital as the PAN's candidate in an election annulled by the military regime. Prior to the
1985 general elections, Arzu had built partnerships in several business ventures with private sector
factions who supported his second successful bid for the mayorship, and later for the presidency.
The contradictory Serrano, a businessperson and highly educated university professor (he holds
five university degrees, including a degree in engineering and a PhD in education), began his
political career under the regime of Gen. Rios Montt. As president of the Council of State, Serrano
participated in drawing up the current constitution and electoral legislation. Although Serrano
presents himself as a populist reformer, he consistently opposed Cerezo's social reform efforts.
In 1987, Serrano and Jorge Carpio spearheaded a private sector protest against Cerezo's attempt
to impose a progressive taxation scheme on the business community. Serrano won important
recognition in 1987, when he was nominated by a coalition of rightist politicians to represent their
parties in the National Reconciliation Commission, set up under the Esquipulas regional accords
to promote internal dialogue and reconciliation. Serrano's participation in the peace process
which peaked when he met with guerrilla leaders last May in Norway and declared his support for
continuing negotiations with the insurgency , boosted his appeal among the electorate. Serrano
was perceived as the best option among the presidential candidates for achieving peace (see
forthcoming Part III of this series). Serrano enjoyed important regional and international support.
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The MAS is affiliated with the International Democrat Union (IDU), a world-wide association of
conservative parties, to which the US Republican Party also belongs. Serrano received multi-million
dollar support from the Republicans, channeled through the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED). He also received support from other IDU members, including Honduran President Rafael
Leonardo Callejas and his party. Callejas also received support from the NED. His company,
Tecnicas Empresariales, sparked a mini-scandal in both countries when its cash donations to MAS
were revealed. Costa Rican President Rafael Angel Calderon of the Social Christian Unity Party
(PUSC), which was also funded by the US Republican Party through the NED, was another Serrano
supporter. Perhaps the clincher in Serrano's electoral victory was the disqualification of Gen.
Rios Montt as presidential candidate in October by the Supreme Court, on the basis of a clause in
the constitution which prohibits persons involved in coup d'etats from running for public office.
Montt, an evangelical fundamentalist, had attracted a significant following among 35 to 40% of
the Guatemalan population who are members of evangelical sects. Serrano, also an evangelical,
was able to pick up this support. After Rios Montt's disqualification in October, Serrano moved
up from 3% or sixth place in the pre-election polls, to third place with 10% of voter support. In the
final weeks before the election, Serrano ran neck and neck with Arzu for second place. Serrano
will be governing with a minority in the National Congress, and can expect to face opposition from
extremist factions in the military, the private sector and the traditional right. In the Congress, MAS
captured only 18 seats. Jorge Carpio's UCN constitutes the largest legislative bloc with 41 seats,
followed by the Christian Democrats with 27. Arzu's party, the PAN, won 12 seats. The remaining
18 seats are divided among small rightist and extreme rightist groups. Moreover, the UCN controls
132 mayorships, the Christian Democrats, 86, and MAS only 13. Aware of the prevailing delicate
balance of power, Serrano named a cabinet of "national unity," involving a coalition with the PAN,
the input of the left-leaning Democratic Socialist Party (PSD), and a distribution of ministries
and posts between different private sector factions. Serrano appointed PAN's Arzu as foreign
minister, and named PAN leaders to head the communications, transportation and public works
ministry, the economy ministry and the central bank. These four PAN appointments cement the
MAS-PAN alliance, and augur what some have suggested will be the merger of the two parties.
Serrano and MAS, as well as the PAN, are unequivocal promoters of modernization through
neo-liberal restructuring. Serrano's economic policy will follow the neo-liberal prescription
already well advanced in Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador, and now in the design stage in
Nicaragua. Expected measures include a reduction in public sector spending, foreign trade and
foreign exchange market liberalization, progressive currency devaluation, and privatization of
public enterprises (communications and other utilities have been mentioned). However, Serrano's
economic cabinet is comprised of distinct economic sectors. On the one hand is CACIF, whose
core is the traditional, extreme-right club of the landed oligarchy and big business, but which has
become increasingly fragmented among old "hard-liners" and more forward looking elements. On
the other hand, there are the "technocrats" of the modernizing, neo-liberal mold. Adolfo Boppel
Carrera former president of the National Agricultural Union (UNAGRO), considered CACIF's
most hard-line member association was appointed Minister of Agriculture, and former CACIF
vice president Guillermo Gonzales Flores was named Secretary of Private and Presidential Affairs.
The neo-liberal "technocrats" are drawn from PAN professionals, mainly the Research and Social
Studies Association (ASIES), under whose sponsorship MAS developed its platform. ASIES was
originally founded by the Christian Democrats with a seed grant from West German Conrad
Adenauer Foundation. It has since developed along the lines of the new breed of neo-liberal think
tanks that have been established in all Central American and most Latin American countries, and
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now enjoys funding from the US and technical-intellectual guidance of private US foundations
linked to the NED, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. While the top leadership
positions at the central bank and the economy ministry went to PAN, the finance ministry went to
ASIES director Raquel Zelaya Rosales, and the education ministry to ASIES board member Maria
Luisa Beltranena de Padilla. Another ASIES leader, Amilcar Gurgos, will head the presidential
council, equivalent to executive's internal staff. Shortly after the runoff, Serrano announced that his
economic policies would be based largely on a document drawn up by ASIES, "Strategic Outline for
the Social and Economic Development of Guatemala, 1991-1995." This document was drafted under
the tutelage of US adviser Arnold Harberger, who headed the "Chicago Boys" team that crafted
Gen. Augusto Pinochet's second economic plan for Chile in the late 1970s. Harberger was first
brought to Guatemala by the "Pyramid Group," an inner circle of CACIF leaders from the country's
more forward looking business interests. Harberger and his team also provided assistance to the
current governments of El Salvador and Honduras in designing respective neo-liberal economic
programs. There are three important difference between the ASIES socio-economic program
and the traditional right's economic positions. These differences underscore the divergence, still
nascent, between the traditional right and the modernizing "New Right" represented by Serrano
and his inner circle. First, the ASIES plan for a "social market economy" emphasizes liberalization
of foreign trade, foreign exchange markets and capital markets, privatization, and other aspects of
the neo-liberal program. Some of these measures affect private sector factions whose development
has been closely linked to protected domestic markets or to privileged access to state resources,
such as certain manufacturers and producers and merchants of traditional exports. Second, the
ASIES plan calls for eliminating the critical fiscal deficit by increasing revenues through taxation
on consumption and income. Guatemala is notorious for the most regressive tax system in Latin
America: tax rates in the 1980s on income and profits were about half the Latin American average.
As mentioned previously, CACIF businesspersons, with the support of hard-line military factions,
have vociferously resisted tax reform, and successfully blocked Cerezo's attempts to this end. Third,
in contrast to CACIF hard-liners, the New Right technocrats stress flexibility in social welfare and
economic policy arenas (as well as in politics), toward accommodating outside interests during the
restructuring process, thereby diffusing tensions. This flexibility is part of the foundation of the New
Right's so-called "social market economy." Interest in at least limited accommodation would help
explain Serrano's decision to bring the left-leaning Democratic Socialists into the governing alliance.
PSD party chief Mario Solorzano, the only left of center politician of prominence in Guatemala,
was named to head the labor ministry. Some analysts say the appointment was aimed at using
Solorzano as an intermediary acceptable to trade unions and popular organizations. Serrano also
named former PSD leader Haroldo Rodas as deputy foreign minister, and PSD founding member
Fernando Fuentes Mohr to head the National Commission for State Reform. Serrano will probably
move cautiously in implementing a stabilization and structural adjustment program in order to
avoid fanning unrest, whether on the far right or on the part of unions and popular sectors. He is
expected to seek a "social pact" similar to the "Economic Solidarity Pact" negotiated by Mexico's
ruling party in 1987 before proceeding with the main aspects of his adjustment program. According
to Finance Minister Raquel Zelaya Rosales, the essence of the pact would be a series of agreements
on prices and wages among the government, labor and private employers. In a recent statement, the
revolutionary left organized into the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) evaluated
Serrano's prospects as follows: "The new government's principal weaknesses are a lack of popular
support and a coherent program. The Serrano government represents the interests of groups
personified by [persons holding] key positions in the president's cabinet. Because his party has
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a minority in appointed government positions and in the Congress, Serrano will have to govern
through compromise and deal-making."

-- End --
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